Research

Work-in-progress

The manager, the bureaucrat, and the autocrat: Personnel appointments in authoritarian bureaucracies

Abstract: Are bureaucratic managers strategic when hiring? Do appointment practices affect service delivery and shape managers’ career progression? A growing literature considers the behavior of bureaucratic managers, predominantly drawing on evidence from electoral democracies. It is not yet clear whether these findings extend to authoritarian settings, where the threat of political punishment is greater and managers’ incentives differ. I present new theory on the behavior of bureaucratic managers in authoritarian settings and use novel data from Kazakhstan to test whether their behavior influences economic outcomes and career progression. I construct time-series data on over 15,000 appointments by district managers and use new measures of bureaucratic effectiveness based on public procurement. My findings suggest that managers use appointment powers to strategically build `teams’ of personally loyal subordinates who—based on interpersonal ties—they trust to follow orders. I show that appointments shape service delivery, with appointees signing more contracts of higher value. Finally, the evidence suggests that managers engaging in excessive appointments are more likely to be dismissed and that service delivery moderates the relationship between appointments and dismissals. The paper provides new evidence on bureaucracies outside of democracies, on subnational officials’ behaviour, and state solutions to bureaucratic control.

  • Presented at PolEcon Almaty 2025
  • Presented at the APSG’s 2025 Summer Conference on Authoritarian Politics

Shuffling to co-opt: Subnational governance, patronage, and political careers in Kazakhstan

Working paper PDF [last update: 25 March 2025]

Abstract: Why do autocrats ‘shuffle’ elites around positions? Existing work suggests this practice aims to boost performance, with underperforming officials more frequently rotated. Yet I show that in Kazakhstan there is no association between performance and rotation. Instead, I explain shuffling as a strategy of co-optation. Shuffling prevents some of the potential downsides of co-opting elites through state office by disrupting network formation and freeing up positions for junior cadre. At the same time, it keeps co-optation credible by reassuring most elites of their long-term seniority. To test this argument, I present a detailed biographic dataset of regional governors (akims) in Kazakhstan between 1997 and 2022. Consistent with my argument, elites holding these posts are frequently shuffled to and from other senior positions. By contrast, there is a robust lack of association between regional socioeconomic measures and when a governor is rotated or dismissed. Sometimes, shuffling aims more at enhancing elites’ loyalty than their performance.

  • Presented at MPSA 2025

Local Elections and Elite Management in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Kazakhstan

With Kirill Melnikov and Eleonora Minaeva

Abstract: This study examines the introduction of local executive elections in Kazakhstan, where rural executives (akims) were previously appointed through a centralized system. We analyze the impact of these elections on elite turnover and recruitment, leveraging a complete dataset of all subdistrict elections and a pilot study of akim biographies. Elections resulted in frequent leadership replacement. Nevertheless, we show that they did not result in inclusion of a broader group of local or the selection of more locally-embedded officials. The results suggest that elections may serve more to formalize the renewal of the same bureaucratic elite than to co-opt new groups or widen access to power.

Which merits matter? Political performance, economic meritocracy, and elite loyalty in authoritarian states

Abstract: Which merits do autocrats care about when selecting officials? In some contexts, regimes prioritise economic competence and promote based on growth or unemployment figures. In other cases, political stability is more important. Officials are incentivised to improve turnout and the proregime vote. These effects may be conditional or—in many cases—performance may simply not matter for appointments. Work on autocratic meritocracy, nonetheless, should consider wider operationalisation of political merit, provide stronger evidence of merit not mattering, and study cases beyond China and Russia. I advance the literature using newly collected evidence on governors’ career trajectories in Kazakhstan paired with economic, electoral, and protest data. I use an equivalence testing approach to provide strong evidence that economic merit—even exceptionally good performance—does not matter in this case, while good political performance can somewhat increase a governors’ prospects of promotion. I contribute to work on promotion tournaments and performance incentives under autocracy, while presenting new data from an important but understudied case of hegemonic electoral autocracy.

  • Presented at EPSA 2025