Research
Work-in-progress
‘Shuffling to co-opt: Subnational governance, patronage, and political careers in Kazakhstan’. PDF [last update: 25 March 2025].
Abstract: Why do autocrats ‘shuffle’ elites around positions? Existing work suggests this practice aims to boost performance, with underperforming officials more frequently rotated. Yet I show that in Kazakhstan there is no association between performance and rotation. Instead, I explain shuffling as a strategy of co-optation. Shuffling prevents some of the potential downsides of co-opting elites through state office by disrupting network formation and freeing up positions for junior cadre. At the same time, it keeps co-optation credible by reassuring most elites of their long-term seniority. To test this argument, I present a detailed biographic dataset of regional governors (akims) in Kazakhstan between 1997 and 2022. Consistent with my argument, elites holding these posts are frequently shuffled to and from other senior positions. By contrast, there is a robust lack of association between regional socioeconomic measures and when a governor is rotated or dismissed. Sometimes, shuffling aims more at enhancing elites’ loyalty than their performance.
- Presented at MPSA 2025.
‘The manager, the bureaucrat, and the autocrat: Personnel appointments in authoritarian bureaucracies’.
Abstract: Are bureaucratic managers strategic when hiring? Do appointment practices affect service delivery and shape managers’ career progression? A growing literature considers the behavior of bureaucratic managers, predominantly drawing on evidence from electoral democracies. It is not yet clear whether these findings extend to authoritarian settings, where the threat of political punishment is greater and managers’ incentives differ. I present new theory on the behavior of bureaucratic managers in authoritarian settings and use novel data from Kazakhstan to test whether their behavior influences economic outcomes and career progression. I construct time-series data on over 15,000 appointments by district managers and use new measures of bureaucratic effectiveness based on public procurement. My findings suggest that managers use appointment powers to strategically build `teams’ of personally loyal subordinates who—based on interpersonal ties—they trust to follow orders. I show that appointments shape service delivery, with appointees signing more contracts of higher value. Finally, the evidence suggests that managers engaging in excessive appointments are more likely to be dismissed and that service delivery moderates the relationship between appointments and dismissals. The paper provides new evidence on bureaucracies outside of democracies, on subnational officials’ behaviour, and state solutions to bureaucratic control.
‘Local Elections and Elite Management in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Kazakhstan’, with Kirill Melnikov and Eleonora Minaeva.
Abstract: This study examines the introduction of local executive elections in Kazakhstan, where rural executives (akims) were previously appointed through a centralized system. We analyze the impact of these elections on elite turnover and recruitment, leveraging a complete dataset of all subdistrict elections and a pilot study of akim biographies. Elections resulted in frequent leadership replacement. Nevertheless, we show that they did not result in inclusion of a broader group of local or the selection of more locally-embedded officials. The results suggest that elections may serve more to formalize the renewal of the same bureaucratic elite than to co-opt new groups or widen access to power.